Update and Summary of the Dependability Assessment of the LHC Beam Dumping System by Filippini, R & Uythoven, J
EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH
European Laboratory for Particle Physics
Update and Summary of the Dependability Assessment of the LHC Beam
Dumping System
The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) must be able to remove the high intensity beams from the LHC
accelerator on demand, at any moment during the operation. As the consequences of a major failure can be
very severe, stringent safety requirements were imposed on the design. The final results of an in-depth
dependability analysis of the LBDS are summarised, assuming one year of operation and different
operational scenarios. The trade-off between safety and availability is discussed, along with the benefit from
built-in features like redundancy, on-line surveillance and post-mortem diagnostics.
Large Hadron Collider Project
Abstract
R. Filippini1), J. Uythoven









 June 26-30, 2006
UPDATE AND SUMMARY OF THE DEPENDABILITY ASSESSMENT OF
THE LHC BEAM DUMPING SYSTEM
R. Filippini∗, J. Uythoven, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) must be able
to remove the high intensity beams from the LHC acceler-
ator on demand, at any moment during the operation. As
the consequences of a major failure can be very severe,
stringent safety requirements were imposed on the design.
The final results of an in-depth dependability analysis of
the LBDS are summarised, assuming one year of operation
and different operational scenarios. The trade-off between
safety and availability is discussed, along with the benefit
from built-in features like redundancy, on-line surveillance
and post-mortem diagnostics.
INTRODUCTION
The LHC Beam Dumping System [1] consists per LHC
beam of 15 horizontally deflecting kickers magnets MKD,
the Q4 quadrupole that enhances the horizontal deflection,
15 vertically deflecting septum magnets MSD and 10 di-
lution magnets MKB, followed by several hundred meters
of beam transfer line before the extracted beam reaches the
dump absorber block TDE, see Figure 1.
During the LHC operation, the system is waiting for a
dump request from the beam interlocking system, which
is part of the LHC Machine Protection System [2]. Once
the dump request is received, a trigger pulse, synchronised
within the beam free gap of 3 µs, is distributed to the MKD
and MKB generators and the beam is extracted into the
dump transfer line. At the instant of the dump request
it is important that all kicker pulse generators and power
converters of the LBDS are tuned at settings proportional
to the beam energy. The beam energy is derived by the
Beam Energy Measurement System (BEMS) from several
LHC main dipole power converters. The power settings are
continuously surveyed by the Beam Energy Tracking Sys-
tem (BETS) and in case of detected errors, the operation is
aborted according to a failsafe strategy. The resulting beam
dump is called a ”false dump”. False dumps are also gen-
erated in case of loss of synchronisation with the beam free
gap and detected failures in the power converters. A Re-
Triggering System (RTS) contributes to a further increase
of safety by covering potential erratic triggers in the MKD
system. After each beam dump, an extensive post mortem
diagnostics is performed.
Most malfunctioning of the LBDS does not lead to beam
losses or leads to beam losses that can be tolerated as their
consequences are mitigated by protective elements in front
of the Q4 and the MSD magnets. Some ”beyond design”
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Figure 1: LBDS functional blocks.
failures have been identified which may lead to the loss of
the entire beam with catastrophic consequences [3]. The
LBDS is classified as a safety critical system. It is an im-
portant component of the LHC Machine Protection System
for which a safety level of SIL3 [4] is required, correspond-
ing to a failure rate in the range 10−8−10−7/h. The aim of
this study is to verify whether the LBDS stays within this
safety requirement at an acceptable detriment to availabil-
ity.
THE MODELING FRAMEWORK
Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) and reliability prediction have been per-
formed for the LBDS [5, 6]. Some 2100 failure modes
have been classified at component level and arranged
into 21 system failure modes with their hazard function
[7]. This information enters a state transition diagram
representing the failure processes at system level.
The state of the system is described by six states
{X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5} that account for the sys-
tem being available {X0, X1, X2, X3}, the system failed
safely {X4} and the system failed unsafely {X5}, see
Figure 2. The available states represent the system with
respect to the status of the BETS and re-triggering sys-
tem RTS. During the LHC operation, transitions drive
state changes from the available states either to the state
X4 or to X5. The model of Figure 2 is a Markov
chain. The state vector X is given a probability distribu-
tion p(t)=[p0(t), p1(t), p2(t), p3(t), p4(t), p5(t)], which is
calculated by the Kolgomorov’s equation [7]:
d
dt
p(t) = p(t)Q(t) (1)
Figure 2: The state transition diagram of the LBDS failure processes.
where Q(t) is the 6 × 6 transition rates matrix. After the
beam has been dumped, the system enters the check phase
in which it cannot fail. The states {X1, X2, X3, X4} are
all recovered to X0, while X5 is absorbing and is not recov-
ered. The system is ‘as good as new’ only if the matrix Q(t)
of the transition rates goes back to its initial value. In this
case, the checks are regeneration points for the stochastic
process.
ANALYSIS
The dependability attributes of interest for the LBDS,
safety and availability, are also defined by the Markov
chain of Figure 2. The system is unsafe if it moves into X5.
The system is safe but unavailable if it moves into X4. The
unavailability is given in term of number of false dumps
generated. The system is analysed over one year (200 days)
of LHC operation, for three different operational scenarios.
Operational scenario 1 (OP1). 400 missions of 10 h
each alternate with checks of 2 h, during which the system
is recovered ‘as good as new’. The analysis requires the
solution of equation (1) for one mission time and the initial
conditions p(0)=[1,0,0,0,0,0]. The formula of unsafety for
one year of operation is:
U = 1− [1− p5(10)]
400 (2)
The number of false dumps is a binomially distributed
random variable with parameter p = p4(10), average 400×
p and standard deviation
√
[400(1− p)p] [7].
Operational scenario 2 (OP2). Like OP1, with the
exception that the system is regenerated only after false
dumps (i.e. repair on demand instead of check at every
beam dump), so that certain failures, masked by redun-
dancy, may accumulate undetected. The analysis requires
the solution of the Markov chain for each mission. The ini-
tial state probability distribution p(t) and the matrix Q(t)










Figure 3: Planned and beam induced dump requests.
are updated on the basis of the results of the previous mis-
sion. Safety is the probability to be in X5 after 400 mis-
sions. Nothing changes for the calculation of the number
of false dumps.
Operational scenario 3 (OP3). Like OP1, with the
exception that the mission duration is a random variable.
Three concurrent events are the regeneration points of the
process: the false dumps, the planned dump requests and
the beam induced dump requests. The planned dump re-
quest event is chosen Weibull distributed, with hazard rate
λ(t) = αλ(λt)α−1. The beam induced dump request is
chosen exponentially distributed with hazard rate λ(t) =
0.001 + (t3 + 10)−1 in order to model a higher rate in the
early 2/3 hours of the injection phase when the beam is
more unstable. The distribution of the dump request for the
operational scenario 3 is shown in Figure 3. The analysis
requires the solution of a Markov regenerative process [7].
The results for the three scenarios are summarised in
Table 1. All analysed scenarios show similar results for
the calculated safety and the number of false dumps, with
the exception of OP2 that, because of partial regeneration
at checks, results in a lower safety. The most realistic esti-
mate is obtained for OP3: unsafety is 2.4× 10−7/year, i.e.
largely SIL4 (< 10−9/h), for 475 missions on average per
Table 1: Results for the three operational scenarios (av.
stands for average).
Scenario Missions/y T [h] Unsafety/y False D.
OP1 400 10 2.418× 10−7 4.0
OP2 400 10 3.150× 10−5 4.0
OP3 475 (av.) 8.1 (av.) 2.401× 10−7 3.9









Figure 4: Apportionment (%) of unsafety (black bars) and
false dumps (gray bars).
year, of which 110 are beam induced dump requests and 4
(±2) are false dumps.
The obtained results will be verified during the reliability
run planned for the end of 2006. A test of three months on
30 MKD assemblies, 60 generator branches in total, allows
to verify that the system is SIL3 at 95% confidence level if
less than 6 failures of individual branches are observed.
The results have also been included in a simplified model
of the LHC Machine Protection System (MPS), which also
comprises the beam loss monitors, the quench protection
system, the powering interlock controller and the beam in-
terlock controller [2].
Criticality and Sensitivity Analyses
Safety and the number of false dumps have been appor-
tioned to the LBDS components, for the operational sce-
nario OP1, see Figure 4. The MKD is the most critical
system contributing by 75% to unsafety and by 60% to the
false dumps. A different apportionment for the false dumps
ascribes 14% false beam dumps to detected energy track-
ing failures, 10% to the erratic triggers (i.e. 0.4 asynchro-
nous dumps), 53% to others failures detected by internal
surveillance and 25% of the false dumps per year to the
false alarms in the surveillance electronics.
A sensitivity analysis makes it possible to investigate the
trade-off between safety and availability with respect to the
many design fault tolerance facilities: the dual branch gen-
erator of the MKD, the redundant triggering system (TS),
the 14 out of 15 redundancy of the MKD, the BETS and the
re-triggering system. The result of the analysis is shown in
Table 2. Almost all cases demonstrate that such measures
are either strictly necessary for reaching the desired level
of safety or they add some extra-margin with a small con-
tribution to the false dumps. The achieved trade-off can be
Table 2: Safety and false dumps trade-off.
Unsafety False D.
Default 2.4× 10−7 (> SIL4) 4.1
No dual branch 2.3× 10−6 (SIL4) 3.0
No redundant TS. 4.7× 10−4 (SIL2) 4.0
14/14 MKD 0.011 (SIL1) 3.9
No BETS 0.059 (< SIL1) 3.4
No RTS 0.32 (< SIL1) 4.1
sensitive to the failure rates of the components included in
the redundant architecture and in the surveillance, like for
example, the power triggers, the power converters and the
beam energy data acquisition channels. In this sense, one
order of magnitude more for the assumed component fail-
ure rates would almost double the number of expected false
dumps, practically without any effect on safety.
CONCLUSIONS
The presented work summarises three years of study on
the LBDS dependability and updates the provisional result,
already presented in a previous publication [8], into the fi-
nal figures for unsafety, 2.4×10−7/year (largely SIL4), and
the number of false dumps, 4 ±2 per year. The MKD sys-
tem has proven to be the most critical component for safety
and the main source of false dumps, which is logical as it is
the most complex system in the LBDS. The analysis of the
model has also demonstrated that a good balance between
safety and availability (number of false dumps) is reached
in the LBDS.
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